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Abstract: The paper assesses the rationale, contributions, structure, and challenges of the field of 
development ethics. Processes of social and economic transformation involve great risks and 
costs and great opportunities for gain, but the benefits, costs and risks are typically hugely 
unevenly and inequitably distributed, as is participation in specifying what they are and their 
relative importance. The ethics of development examines the benefits, costs, risks, formulations, 
participation, and options. The paper outlines a series of ways of characterizing such work, 
arguments for and against its importance, and some of its important sources and contributions, 
especially from the interdisciplinary stream of work represented over several decades by Denis 
Goulet. Definitions are diverse since the work covers many different intersections of practice and 
theorizing, at multiple levels. The paper considers and replies to arguments against discussing 
development ethics: claims that it involves only endless proliferation of different opinions, is an 
expensive luxury that undermines long-run development, is superfluous if one already works with 
the capability approach or the human rights tradition, or never has influence. Finally, it presents 
suggestions for how development ethics thinking can have increased impact, with reference to 
incorporation in policy analysis and planning methods, professional codes and training, and to its 
intellectual location and communication strategies. The field should articulate the methodological 
pragmatism which much of it has adopted, consistent with its required role as a practice-oriented 
interdisciplinary meeting ground.  
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1 This paper grows out of: a public lecture at the Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, in 2007; a note in 
Human Development Insights, 24, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HD_Insights_January2009.pdf; ideas in 
Gasper and St. Clair (2010); and a presentation to a UNESCO conference on ‘Rethinking Development: 
Ethics and Social Inclusion’, Mexico City, 2011. My thanks go to an anonymous referee and the journal 
editor for their advice, and to Asuncion Lera St. Clair for ongoing intellectual partnership and valuable 
comments on the present paper. 
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1. Why essay development ethics?  
 
Modernity ‘promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world—and at 
the same time, …threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are’ 
(Berman 1983, 15). 
 
The rationale for the field of development ethics is that processes of social, political and 
economic development bring both enormous opportunities and enormous threats for 
humankind, individually and collectively, and that the associated benefits and costs are 
typically highly unfairly distributed. Ten to fifteen million people a year, for example, are 
displaced from their place of residence in order to make way for development projects, 
with often inadequate or no compensation and with severe harm to their well-being. 
While human powers have grown astonishingly in the past three centuries, so have the 
differentials of power and good fortune between different persons and groups within 
countries and between countries and regions. Many countries unfortunately match the 
description that Denis Goulet (1983) cited for Mexico: a rich country full of poor people. 
 
‘Development’ – whether understood as fundamental transformations including 
industrialisation, urbanisation, globalisation and more; as planned intervention; as 
improvement in human welfare; or as expansion of valued attainable opportunities – is 
correspondingly a strongly ethically-laden field. What are all the running, risk-taking and 
intervention for? What are improvement, welfare, the good life? Why are so many of the 
materially affluent spiritually poor? Who benefits, who loses? Who decides, who is 
consulted, who is not? Whose values count? 
 
Some key themes in development ethics have been that, first, the gains of some groups 
have been directly conditional on planned suffering for others—a theme for which we 
can take Peter Berger’s label: ‘pyramids of sacrifice’ (Berger 1974)—as in the suffering 
of slaves in the processes of generation of agricultural and mining wealth from the 
Americas, or of rural labourers displaced to become urban proletarians in the 
industrialisation of Western Europe and Russia. More generally, long term societal 
development involves enormous investments by preceding generations that are often to 
the benefit overwhelmingly of later generations, not of themselves. This investment has 
been induced in diverse ways besides voluntary contract: through forced labour, physical 
displacement leading into capitalist wage-labour, or labour perceived in terms of loyalty, 
duty, honour, solidarity or self-fulfilment.  
 
Mainstream economics often employs the utilitarian principle of maximising net benefits 
regardless of on whom the benefits or costs fall, sharing Lenin’s readiness to ‘break eggs 
in order to make omelettes’. Besides the disputes over that principle comes the question 
of how it is applied in reality. Michael Cernea, the first and leading sociologist in the 
history of the World Bank, remarks that: ‘we find much in evaluation work that is totally 
ethically unacceptable’ (Cernea 2006), for example studies that legitimated creating parks 
for rich tourists at the cost of removing the livelihoods of poor local residents, on the 
basis of projections of future numbers of tourists that were never plausible. We see here 
the combination of a cost-benefit-analysis methodology that impresses through its 
apparent inclusiveness, sophistication and precision but that can endorse proposals that 
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make poor people poorer for the benefit of richer people, and a practice that exacerbates 
this feature by its openness to manipulation and to generation of highly unreliable 
scenarios. 
 
‘Some get the gains, others get the pains’, remarked Cernea (2006), after a lifetime of 
observation of forced displacement of low-income populations. The creation of national 
parks, for example, has typically been comprehensively at the expense of the previous 
residents. Oliver-Smith records the ‘abject failure of so many resettlement projects to 
produce tangible benefits for displaced communities. …. [T]he record of dismal failures 
and concomitant pain and suffering for the displaced continues with depressing 
regularity’ (Oliver-Smith 2009, 17). Even where compensation exercises are present: 
‘Overwhelming evidence documents pervasive and multidimensional distortions of 
compensation in practice’ (Cernea 2008, 56). Thirty-six out of forty-four dam-related 
resettlement cases reviewed by Scudder (2005) showed direct material loss to the people 
displaced, quite apart from the psychological and social losses.  
 
Second, good fortune for some can generate unplanned suffering for others, as when 
booming incomes in some sections of society or some parts of the world pull food 
resources out of poorer areas and out of the affordable reach of the poorest people, 
leading even to famine and death. Amartya Sen elaborated how famines are not 
necessarily caused by lack of food but by poor people’s lack of power to command food, 
which can occur partly as a side-effect of richer people’s greater power to command 
resources (Sen 1981; Dreze and Sen eds. 1990). He analysed these mechanisms in a 
series of famines that cost millions of lives, in the 19
th
 century in India and Ireland, the 
Bengal famines of 1943-4 and 1974, and the Ethiopian famines of 1973 and 1974. Mike 
Davis (2001) builds on Sen’s insight in an account of the late 19th and early 20th century 
famines in India, China and Brazil which brought tens of millions of deaths. He recounts 
how the impacts of climatic shocks caused by el Niño currents in the Pacific Ocean were 
mediated by new systems of colonial power, global trade connections and economic 
ideology. Comparable shocks in the 18
th
 century in China and India had been managed 
with far less loss of life, by governments that were not committed to a principle that 
starvation reflected immutable economic and Malthusian law and that had retained a 
capacity to intervene effectively. In the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century cases, with 
markets now left free to determine allocation, some groups in drought-hit areas ended 
with no enforceable claims over food. Food flowed instead between regions and social 
groups purely in response to demand from those with money, locally and internationally, 
without compensating public action, thus leading to the malnutrition and premature death 
of millions. Perhaps the casus classicus of such a famine occurred in Ireland in the 1840s, 
a corner of the then leading country in the world, the United Kingdom, at the precise 
moment of the triumph of principles of government non-intervention and free trade. It 
took the lives of ten to fifteen per cent of the Irish population (see e.g. Mokyr, 2006). 
Such types of ‘side-effect’ and ‘collateral damage’ are widespread in an interconnected 
world (cf. Bauman, 2011). They are marginal only in terms of the attention often given to 
them, not marginal in their occurrence and human significance.  
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Third, besides this ‘calculus of pain’ (Peter Berger’s term), concerning the distribution of 
costs between people and across generations, is what Berger called the ‘calculus of 
meaning’: how far does the acquisition of and preoccupation with material comforts and 
conveniences bring or jeopardise a fulfilling and meaningful life? The meanings and use 
of material things depend on people’s own values; and material means, important as they 
are for a life of dignity, are insufficient for a truly human life. 
 
In addressing the calculi of pain and meaning, the choices we face are not between a first 
option called ‘without development’ and a second option called ‘development’, but 
between many versions and styles of ‘development’, that differ in terms of destination 
and of the character of the path towards it. Much of the suffering along past and 
contemporary paths of development is avoidable. Societally and globally we have real 
choices. In Latin America, for example, Costa Rica has long illustrated one distinctive 
and in many ways admirable path (see e.g. Deneulin 2006). Attention to ethics is 
important for choosing directions and also for understanding behaviour, because people 
use and are moved by ethical ideas, as we see for example with reference to the growth 
and impact of human rights thinking. 
 
Fourth, deserving special attention, given the growth of human powers to do good and do 
harm, are the issues of pain and meaning concerning unborn generations and the already 
born children who are not yet able to participate in societal decisionmaking. Taking their 
interests fairly into account, and respecting environmental fragility and constraints, might 
be called the calculus of sustainability. The Great Transition Initiative, founded by the 
Stockholm Environment Institute, notes the following areas of critical uncertainties for 
sustainability: environmental risks, economic instabilities, and socio-political 
combustibility (Raskin et al. 2002). The three are heavily interconnected, which brings 
the danger of chain-reaction crises—triggered by climate change, pandemics, financial 
collapse, mega-terrorism, or key resource shortages—that contemporary institutions will 
be unable to manage. Karl Polanyi (1957) and others analysed the great transition from 
agricultural to industrial market society in Europe, and the eventual institutional 
responses to cope with the enormously disruptive yet productive forces of the ‘Unbound 
Prometheus’ (Landes 2003). We now require, concludes the Great Transition Initiative, 
another great institutional and cultural transition, to more sustainable societies. Building 
on analyses done for the Earth Charter and elsewhere, it identifies three major types of 
value change required: from consumerism (the religion of salvation through buying) to a 
focus on quality of life; from individualism to human solidarity; and to ecological 
sensitivity, away from attitudes of domination and exploitation of nature (Kates et al. 
2006).  
 
Denis Goulet’s contribution (1971, 2006) was to synthesise and apply all the themes we 
have mentioned. He was an earlier and perhaps more profound exponent of the notion of 
‘human development’ than the thinkers whose work became embodied in the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s Human Development Reports since 1990 
(Gasper 2008a). He articulated a theory of value criteria relevant for assessing 
development outcomes and processes, and examined the value-conflicts and costs in 
typical development processes such as technology transfer (Goulet 1977). Goulet became 
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the main academic leader of a self-conscious ‘development ethics’ from the 1960s to 
1990s. 
 
2. What is development ethics ?  
 
2.1: As questions / responses / an academic field / a self-conscious movement 
 
‘Development ethics’ can be considered, in one sense, as a field of attention, an agenda of 
questions about major value choices involved in processes of social and economic 
development. It is comparable then to, and overlaps with, business ethics, medical ethics, 
environmental ethics and other areas of practical ethics. Each area of practice generates 
ethical questions about priorities and procedures, rights and responsibilities. In this case 
the questions include: What is good or ‘real’ development? What is the good life which 
development policy should seek to facilitate, what really are benefits? How are benefits 
and costs to be shared, within the present generation and between generations? Who 
decides and how? What rights of individuals should be respected and guaranteed? 
When—in for example the garment trade, the sex trade, the ‘heart trade’ in care services, 
and the trade in human organs—should ‘free choice’ in the market be seen instead as the 
desperation behavior of people who have too little real choice? Besides such issues of 
policy-level ethics come the numerous ethical tensions and choices in the daily work and 
interactions of development professionals. (Glover 1995, Goulet 1988, and Hamelink 
1997 give fuller statements of agendas for development ethics.)  
 
Development ethics work has arisen as a follow-on to the emergence of self-conscious 
professional fields—fields that span public policy, programmes, organizations, careers, 
education, training, research, and sometimes proposed codes of practice—of ‘economic 
development’ and development economics, ‘social development’ and development 
sociology/anthropology, ‘politics of development’, and so on, and overall of 
‘international development’ and ‘development studies’/‘international development 
studies’. So a preliminary answer to the ‘Why?’ question is that every field of practice 
requires a practical and theorised ethics. Such an ethics, in every case, spans from work 
which is narrowly technical-professional, to work which is more theoretical-academic, to 
work which engages with wider publics.  
 
The development field is so broad though, that there are limits to the analogy to other 
areas of professional ethics. The problem arises that development ethics might touch 
almost everything and so cohere less as an area than do business ethics or medical ethics. 
This clearly forms no argument against the activity of thinking in an ethically careful way 
about problems and possibilities in development policy and practice. It means though that 
this activity may not form a tidy self-enclosed field. The all-encompassing scope of 
‘development’ makes it less a particular specialist area and more a meta-area that aims to 
link and inform many other areas. 
 
Second, development ethics can be considered also as the diverse body of work that has 
tried to address the questions mentioned above, and the various sets of answers that are 
offered. This includes work from long before the label ‘development ethics’ existed; for 
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example, 19
th
 century writers like Henri de Saint-Simon, John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx 
stated positions on many of the questions. (See e.g. the surveys in Lutz & Luz 1988, 
Cowen & Shenton 1996.) It also includes current work that might not use the name 
‘development ethics’ but addresses various of its questions, such as work by Amartya Sen 
or Joseph Stiglitz.  Peter Berger’s famous Pyramids of Sacrifice (1974), stimulated by 
visits to Mexico and critical interaction with Ivan Illich, described itself as political ethics 
applied to social change in the Third World. 
 
Third, more narrowly, we have work which uses the name ‘development ethics’. Its 
founder, if any one person should have the title, was the socio-economist Louis Lebret 
(1897-1966) who led a group called Économie et Humanisme which worked first in 
France and then in many other countries. The group was formed in 1941 and reflected the 
experience of the inter-war depression years and a revulsion at avoidable deprivation and 
suffering in processes of societal advance from which many other people benefit greatly. 
It sought to contribute to a better postwar world through constructing and applying a 
more humane vision for economic systems. Through a dialogue between economics, 
other social sciences, theology and philosophy, Économie et Humanisme promoted a 
forerunner of the present day idea of human development. Lebret was a lead contributor 
to Pope Paul VI’s encyclical Populorum Progressio, a key source for liberation theology 
and its ‘option for the poor’ (e.g., Gutierrez 1971). His group also had important direct 
impact in Latin American thinking more widely. Variants of its themes of humanization 
of the economy and of human liberation continue in the writings of contemporary Latin 
American philosophers and social theorists like Enrique Dussel (1978, 2007).   
 
Similar work emerged elsewhere, including much written in Spanish and Portuguese. 
Notable for articulating in English these Francophone, Hispanic and Lusophone 
literatures and connecting them to Anglophone work and new global networks was 
Lebret’s student, the American existentialist and social planner Denis Goulet (1931-
2006), not least through his book The Cruel Choice (1971). Goulet stressed too the 
importance of understanding faith-based value systems, as held by perhaps most people 
around the world, especially in lower-income countries (e.g. Goulet 1980); and linked to 
various perspectives from the South, for example from Buddhist traditions. (See also 
Gunatilleke ed. 1983.) Development ethics, Goulet proposed, considers the contents of 
worthwhile development, the acceptable distribution of its costs and risks as well as of its 
benefits, and the ethical quality of its methods of analysis and practice, including the 
questions of who should decide and who has responsibility to act. 
 
So a distinct area of work in academic ethics and social philosophy has called itself 
‘development ethics’ since the 1950s (e.g., Goulet 1960, 1965). It attempts to focus on 
fundamental human priority issues: How well are we (as a society, as a world) doing? 
Who suffer? Who (does not) gain? Where are we going? Some of this work looks largely 
only at low-income countries, though with reference also to their relations with high-
income countries. Other work recognises that high-income countries are not necessarily 
highly humanly developed; it looks at poverty and exclusion, emptiness and malaise, 
indignity and insecurity in rich countries too (e.g. Burgess et al. 2007).  
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Nigel Dower distinguishes development ethics by its attention to evaluating societal paths. 
Traditional ethics has asked "How ought one to live as an individual?". Development ethics 
asks, he suggests, "How ought a society to exist and move into the future?" (cf. Dower 
2008). It is thus a central part of social ethics, while clearly not all of it. Dower stated a 
similar question for world society, in order to define a sister field of world or global ethics 
(Dower 2007). One might perhaps equally call that field ‘global development ethics’. 
‘Development ethics’ and ‘global development ethics’ are not really separable: 
development ethics includes questions about how different societies in the world relate to 
each other in the process of moving into the future. 
 
Broader than Dower’s definition of development ethics is Goulet’s: the examination of 
‘ethical and value questions posed by development theory, planning, and practice’. Its 
mission is ‘to diagnose value conflicts, to assess policies (actual and possible), and to 
validate or refute valuations placed on development performance’ (Goulet, 1997, 1168). 
Over time there has been growing reference to ethics in discussions on long- and short- 
term development policy: in human rights discourse and activism, the Human 
Development Reports, the Millennium Declaration, and concerns with business 
corporations’ responsibilities and the interests of future generations. Many streams of 
work in this terrain—including usually the great river of human rights work, or the 
‘human-scale development’ thinking of Manfred Max-Neef and collaborators—have not 
used the name ‘development ethics’ but match its description.  
 
Fourth, it is worth highlighting networks and organizations that have explicitly articulated 
a development ethics agenda and tried to institutionalise the field, via publications, 
meetings, regular information exchange and courses.
 
The International Development 
Ethics Association (IDEA), in particular, was formed in 1984 (http://www.development-
ethics.org/ ). It has not been oriented only to academic philosophy but been committed to 
interdisciplinary and policy-relevant work. Working in this style, Crocker, Penz and 
others (see e.g., Aman, ed., 1991; Crocker, 1991, 2008; Penz et al., 2011) have linked 
Goulet’s thinking to other research traditions, including of human development, human 
rights and deliberative democracy.
2
 
 
2.2: Intersections of practice and theorizing, at multiple levels 
 
There is no single agreed definition of development ethics. This is inevitable, for 
development ethics lies at the intersection of other fields, each of which brings its own 
concerns, and the nature of the intersection may change with time. We saw already an 
example of instead an ostensive definition, which though less elegant is also 
enlightening: whatever work has used or accepted the label ‘development ethics’. But we 
saw also how this is insufficient: much work on the same issues has not used the label. 
Let us add then a more structured but still ostensive definition. One can view 
development ethics work as occurring at the intersections between relevant streams of 
                                               
2 Surveys of development ethics, by authors active in IDEA, include Crocker (1991), which uses all four 
definitions above, Schwenke (2008) which focuses on the first (policy challenges), Crocker (2008) which 
concentrates on the second (academic work on such challenges), and Gasper (2004) which combines the 
first and second.  
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theorizing in ethics and relevant streams in development experience and practice. 
Distinguishable streams of practice concern, for example: socioeconomic development 
policy, programs and projects; human rights activism and practice; emergency relief, 
conflict and humanitarian intervention; the world of employment and corporate 
responsibility; migration; and climate change. Distinguishable families of theorizing 
(each of which contains diverse strands) include, for example: mainstream moral 
philosophy; religions; humanism (as drawn on by Goulet, Berger, Illich, Max-Neef or 
Schumacher); critiques of mainstream economics (such as by Sen and the human 
development approach, with regard to welfare economics; or critiques of capitalism); 
well-being research; human rights theory and jurisprudence; feminist theory; and 
professional/practical ethics, which has become in part a territory of theorizing of its own. 
Development ethics includes and interconnects each of these multiple sites of reflection. 
(See Gasper and Truong 2010, for elaboration of this ostensive approach to definition.) 
Definitions which select and honour only one particular type of ethical theory, for example 
human rights or the capability approach, are too narrow. Both those types of theorizing are 
important, but they do not provide everything that is needed, as we will see; and the same 
applies to any other single ethical tradition.  
 
We can refine the picture by adding a third dimension, for we must distinguish at least the 
following levels of focus: 1. International and global relations; 2. National trajectory and 
public policy; 3. Organizational conduct; 4. Personal conduct.  Dower’s definition 
highlighted the second level: national trajectory. But most treatments of development ethics, 
including those by Goulet and Crocker, cover all the levels. Indeed, combination of the 
levels appears essential: one cannot understand issues and choices at any level well without 
reference also to the other levels.  
 
After the ostensive definitions, let us return to Goulet’s proposed explicit definition, as 
helpful, manageable and still relevant: the examination of ethical and value questions 
posed by development theory, planning, and practice, in order to diagnose value conflicts, 
assess policies, and assess valuations placed on development performance (Goulet 1997). 
Standard topics in development ethics then include debates about: 
- the values proposed as constituting the meaning of human-, societal- and/or 
global- development and as requiring respect, prioritisation and incorporation into 
legal frameworks and/or public action; including principles concerning priority 
goods (and bads) and their distribution, and by what processes decisions should 
be made; 
- evaluation of experiences and proposed action alternatives;   
- methods and methodologies for such discussion, analysis, design, evaluation, 
incorporation and action. 
The recent volumes by Crocker (2008) and Penz, Drydyk and Bose (2011) constitute 
mature examples of work with this agenda.  
 
It is worth underlining the context in which these debates arise. Development ethics looks 
at challenges and costs of processes of development and change in a world context of, first, 
great possibilities for promotion of human well-being but very incomplete systems of rights 
and responsibilities to fulfil this potential; second, extreme global inequalities, that 
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constantly affect and distort life and action in ‘the South’; third, extreme inequities globally, 
in the senses that much of the past record of change has involved oppression in and of the 
global South and that present-day citizens in the North inherit privileges that they have not 
individually done much to earn; and fourth, considerable shared risks—of and from climate 
change, conflict, pandemics, etc.—of harms that will typically hit the weakest groups the 
hardest (see e.g. UNDP 2007). 
 
3. Objections to development ethics 
 
3.1. Objection 1: Does it generate only endless proliferation of different opinions? 
 
Some critics hold that ethics is a matter of taste, and that tastes differ dramatically and 
incorrigibly. In reality, we observe some considerable and gradually growing areas of 
consensus, nationally and internationally, including to a slowly growing extent regarding 
human rights; and within specific decision-making areas we find valuable opportunities 
for fruitfully ‘dealing with differences’ (Forester 2009). Peter Penz (1991) and Mozaffar 
Qizilbash (2002), amongst others, point out that while differences exist between leading 
perspectives that have evolved and/or been widely employed in development ethics—
such as theories of needs, of prudential values, Sen and Nussbaum’s variants of a 
capabilities approach, and the theories of John Rawls on primary goods and John Finnis 
on basic goods—these perspectives have extensive areas in common and even more 
extensive shared implications. Similarly, when Penz (2003) analyses the ethics of forced 
displacement due to development projects, he shows the strengths of a methodology of 
applied ethics that ‘focuses on generalisable principles, but does not commit itself to a 
particular normative theory’ (Penz, p.142). He uses this intermediate methodology to 
build arguments that can command support from many different normative theories, 
regarding the responsibilities of various domestic agents and foreign agents in cases of 
actual or threatened forced displacement.
3
 Sen has expounded and applied a similar 
pragmatic approach (e.g. Sen 2009, chs. 4, 18). In other words, we do not need universal 
acceptance of one specific detailed ethical theory in order to make progress in ethical 
choices. Absence of such acceptance does not leave us to rely only on intuition or locally 
regnant values.  
 
Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz shows similarly how a pragmatic methodology can 
offer scope for quite widely persuasive evaluations. For assessing the operations of rich 
country governments and the international organizations that they control, in their 
dealings with low-income countries, Stiglitz (2005) adopted a set of ethical precepts that 
he did not seek to prove but could plausibly claim command wide acceptance. The 
precepts are: honesty (including no withholding of important information); fairness (in 
the sense of treating similar cases similarly); social justice (in the minimal sense of 
respecting basic needs, including needs for dignity); and responsibility (including taking 
                                               
3 Using this approach, Penz, Drydyk and Bose (2011) present a system of ethics for cases of threatened or 
actual displacement. It amends and extends the perspective advanced by the World Commission on Dams 
(2000). They derive ethical guidelines for local, national and international responsibilities, with special 
reference to dam projects, on the basis of a proposed synthesis of core values found in United Nations and 
other work, that they suggest constitutes a widely accepted  consensus ‘human development ethic’. 
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into account, and being accountable for, the external effects that one causes). Honesty 
and responsibility imply that we should make clear the limits of the information and 
understanding from which we advise, or press, others to act. This has often not been done 
by international financial institutions and rich country governments in their relations with 
developing countries. Instead they have typically relied on their financial muscle to 
enforce their prescriptions, such as for full mobility of capital, and left the risks to be 
borne by the weakest parties. They have also not treated like cases alike: arguments about 
social dislocation which rich countries have used to block global free movement of 
labour have been waved aside when used by developing country governments to argue 
against global free movement of capital. Stiglitz’s review of the conduct of the 
international financial institutions and international development agencies in the 1990s 
led him to a further precept: maintain rather than tear apart the existing fabric of social 
norms and cooperation. He found this principle to have been grossly violated in the shock 
economic reforms during that decade that destroyed the value of ordinary people’s 
pension rights in Russia while distributing huge wealth to a new priviligentsia. Elsewhere 
he argues for more and deeper democracy at all levels (Stiglitz 2007). 
 
3.2. Objection 2: Is it an expensive luxury that undermines real development? 
 
One might grant that the concerns highlighted in development ethics are valid, and that 
argumentation about responsibilities and responses may in some cases be able to 
command wide support. Still, one can ask: what is the relative importance of such 
concerns? Does a preoccupation with them get in the way of ‘real development’—notably, 
economic growth—and is that not the best solvent of all such problems, which arise as 
side-effects of scarcity and backwardness? Answering this objection leads us to consider 
both the relative importance of the concerns as independent values and their instrumental 
significance. 
 
The British historian R.H. Tawney (1880-1962) proposed that: 
“The most obvious facts are the most easily forgotten. Both the existing economic 
order and too many of the projects advanced for reconstructing it break down 
through their neglect of the truism that, since even quite common men have souls, 
no increase in material wealth will compensate for arrangements which insult 
their self-respect and impair their freedom. A reasonable estimate of economic 
organization must allow for the fact that, unless industry is to be paralysed by 
recurrent revolts on the part of outraged human nature, it must satisfy criteria 
which are not purely economic” (Tawney 1926: 284; cited by McCann 2003: 196). 
 
Tawney’s estimate receives support from many polls and studies of well-being, such as 
the World Bank’s Voices of the Poor project. The three Voices of the Poor volumes 
(Narayan, Patel, et al. 2000; Narayan, Chambers et al. 2000; Narayan and Petesch 2002) 
presented views about well-being and ill-being expressed by over 60,000 respondents 
around the world. Economic growth is found to be no guarantee of human well-being. 
Beyond higher middle-income levels wealth and income are not even substantially 
correlated with either subjective well-being or many aspects of objective well-being 
(Bruni and Porta eds. 2007). 
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These findings about the felt independent importance of ethical concerns have corollaries 
in terms of their instrumental significance. If we wish to understand and influence human 
behaviour, then we need to think about ethics, among other matters; for people are in part 
motivated and guided by ethical ideas, among other types of idea. If people feel that they 
are treated unfairly, in terms of the ethical principles they subscribe to, this affects their 
motivation and cooperation and can lead to conflict. Since people engage seriously in 
ethical debate and are moved by ethical beliefs, looking closely at ethics is an essential 
part of good explanatory work too, Amartya Sen reminded economists in his On Ethics 
and Economics (1987). Similarly, attention to and respect for people’s ethical beliefs has 
instrumental importance for designing effective styles of intervention and interaction.  
 
Methods of interaction that do not respect what participants consider to be their rights, 
including their rightful degree of autonomy, are likely to undermine their commitment 
and involvement. David Ellerman’s Helping People to Help Themselves (2005) looks at 
how processes employed in development cooperation affect the growth of recipient 
autonomy. He concludes that autonomy-promoting assistance turns out to be very close 
to rights-respecting assistance. Unhelpfully intrusive ‘help’, whether it is ‘help’ that 
replaces beneficiaries’ own activity or ‘help’ that dictates their pattern of activity and 
hence replaces their decision-making, simultaneously offends their felt rights to be active 
makers of their own lives and leaves underutilised their capacities, knowledge and will. 
The negative effects of these two lines of counter-productive ‘help’ then reinforce each 
other in scenarios of apathy and resistance, leading to wasteful use of resources and 
frequent failures to fulfil objectives. 
 
Discussion of ethical questions and principles is sometimes felt as embarrassing — 
precisely because rather than being a luxury it touches on fundamentals of identity and 
motivation. As human beings we undertake our lives using notions about what are 
appropriate ends and rights and due respect, and those ideas demand attention: for 
understanding behaviour, for in negotiations, and for motivation. As recognised by 
Berger in his emphasis on the calculus of meaning, and by Tawney from his review of 
history, according people dignity is not a luxury; nor is it very expensive. People feel it as 
a basic need, and to neglect it is liable to be far more expensive, for neglect triggers 
conflict. This principle underlies the United Nations Charter: ‘the explicit linkage of 
human rights protections to an international order of peace and security. … Collective 
security now [is] seen to require the defense of human rights norms and principles’ 
(Quataert 2009, 40). Articulating the principle has become part of the ‘human security’ 
approach, as sister to conventional human rights advocacy. 
 
3.3. Objection 3: Why bother, when we already have the human development and 
capability approach and/or the human rights tradition?  
 
Human development thinking, as formulated by Mahbub ul Haq, Paul Streeten and others 
and incorporated in the work for the global, national and regional Human Development 
Reports, contains both an ethical perspective and a theory of interconnections. Both arose 
in reaction to the traditional perspective in economics. The principle of interconnection 
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holds that many linkages that are not mediated and measured through economic means 
are very important, including for economic life: for example, the linkages from lopsided 
income distribution to malnutrition to reduced learning capacity and lower lifetime 
earning capacity, or the linkages from skewed international trading systems to societal 
stresses and conflict in low-income countries. As we saw, this principle of 
interconnection widens the ethics agenda and requires wider scope in explanations too. It 
brings a focus on the ‘side-effects’ that damage some people, for example, when greater 
purchasing power and greater political power for some groups makes food unaffordable 
for weaker groups or leads to their displacement from lands that more powerful people 
now desire (see e.g. Blaser et al., 2004).  
 
Human development theory’s ethical perspective, the capability approach, holds that the 
ethical principles embodied in market-based economics do not suffice for public policy; 
instead market values are deemed important primarily insofar as they support humanly 
valuable ‘be-ings’ and ‘do-ings’. This component in human development theory is vital, 
but is far from giving a full ethical basis; for example, for how to handle conflicts 
between and within different people’s valued ‘be-ings and do-ings’. Capability theory 
explicitly declares that it is not a full ethical system. Human development theory 
formulated in terms of a capability space emphasises that space, but tells us nothing about 
what within such a space is valuable; though it rightly rejects the idea that everything 
whatsoever in this space is valuable. 
 
To think about the ethical meaning(s) of ‘human’, and about trade and sweated labour, 
forced displacement or professional ethics, human development thinking must draw on 
longerstanding discussions. The ethical traditions that should be consulted lie not only in 
mainstream Anglo-American academic philosophy (see e.g., Cameron & Ojha 2007; Giri 
2002, Hamelink ed. 1997, Quarles van Ufford & Giri eds. 2003, for some attempts to cast 
the net wider); and they include not least the decades-long development ethics tradition 
of Lebret, Goulet, and those influenced by their approach (see e.g.: Lebret, 1967; Goulet 
1971; Esquith & Gifford eds. 2010; Ethics and Economics, vol. 4(2), 2006; Schwenke 
2008; Wilber & Dutt eds. 2010).  
 
What exactly is the relationship of development ethics to human rights, an older and 
larger tradition than the work that has explicitly called itself development ethics ? 
Tawney defined the whole humanistic tradition in terms of its treatment of material 
inputs and wealth ‘as means to an end, and that this end is the growth towards perfection 
of individual human beings’ (cited by Lutz 1992a, 98). Lutz called this ‘a welfare 
standard explicitly expressed in terms of human welfare rather than “economic” or 
“social welfare”’ (1992a, 103). He summarized the welfare standard as ‘material 
sufficiency and human dignity for all’ (1992b, 166), further summarized as respect for 
basic human rights. Human rights ideas have become a language with which nearly 
everyone is able and willing to communicate and around which most people can unite. 
However, reflecting the growth of separate bureaucracies for development, human rights, 
peacekeeping and emergency relief from the mid 20
th
 century, separate lines of work 
were cultivated for several decades (Murphy 2006; Quataert 2009). From the 1990s the 
gap has considerably reduced, in part through the leadership provided in the late 1990s by 
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the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and then UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Mary Robinson. Also the work on human development and human security led by 
Mahbub ul Haq, Amartya Sen, Richard Jolly, Martha Nussbaum and others has helped to 
link development thought to the project of universal human rights (Jolly et al. 2009).  
 
While thinking in terms of human rights provides a central strand in development ethics it 
does not fit or suffice for all the issues, contexts and tasks that we face. Human rights 
theory has a largely individualistic orientation. Different human rights can conflict and 
require prioritization, yet the rights tradition generally insists on inviolability. Too many 
claims can become asserted as inviolable human rights, including even property rights, 
not least ‘intellectual property rights’. Defining definite duties that correspond to asserted 
rights is often problematic. Prioritization, duty-specification and enforcement have 
conventionally relied in large part on a cumbersome legal system which is far more 
accessible to the rich and powerful (Gasper 2007). Rights language in isolation is thus at 
risk of becoming rigid and legalistic, set in forms and institutions which in practice often 
exclude poor people.  
 
We require a richer value basis than only rights or only capabilities or the two together. 
Not all relevant values can be thought of in terms of rights and duties; we need attention 
also to virtues and to processes of equitable and respectful negotiation (Held 1995; 
O’Neill 1996; World Commission on Dams 2000; Forester 2009; Penz et al. 2011). The 
value basis must include attention to the grounds, processes and formats of ethical 
reasoning, and also to attitudes of caring and commitment.  
 
Capability is only one aspect of humanity. Vulnerability is another, as emphasised in 
human security analysis and in Goulet’s The Cruel Choice (1971), in which the second 
chapter was entitled: ‘Vulnerability: the key to understanding and promoting 
development’. One reason why human security thinking has gathered momentum is that 
it integrates the languages of capability, rights and security. It elaborates the foundational 
principle of the United Nations that without respect for basic human rights there will be 
no sustained security. Underlying that principle is a deeper picture of human personality, 
emotion, sociability and lived experience than has been used in some thinking on human 
rights and human development (Gasper 2009, 2010). The approach makes us ask: What is 
the ‘human’ minimum that each person has a right to secure, beyond possession of a set 
of reasoned preferences and capacities for choice? An exploited garment worker and the 
seller of a kidney may have made informed and reasoned choices. Similarly, in thinking 
about responsible lifestyles, or respectful (and therefore more effective) forms of advice 
and influence, or in trying to understand and counteract corruption, we can draft and use 
codes of rights and duties but we also need much more. Human security thinking 
helpfully connects also to the roots in humanistic psychology, humanistic philosophy and 
daily moral life that fed Goulet’s thinking and related work in development ethics. 
 
3.4. Objection 4: Does development ethics ever have any impact? 
 
Moral arguments may have little force to change policy and action if they remain 
‘external critiques’ not absorbed into accepted ‘expert’ knowledge, and if the ethical 
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critiques come from diverse sources with little recognition, understanding and respect for 
each other. How can ideas with broad appeal and yet practical applicability be crafted, 
promoted and absorbed? The now widely accepted definition of development as 
centering on how people can live as judged by a range of human values—from basic 
material needs through a range of higher aspirations for expression, self-realization and 
dignity—was clear in the work of Lebret in the 1950s and Goulet in the 1960s to 1980s, 
but became more influential only in the 1990s when taken up by a network led by a well 
situated and charismatic policy entrepreneur (Mahbub ul Haq) who seized on a 
favourable combination of circumstances in order to institutionalise this conception, in 
the Human Development Reports and related activity (Haq and Ponzio 2008; Gasper 
2011). 
 
Grander examples offer lessons too, from the decades-long campaign against slavery that 
was eventually successful despite the continuing economic profitability of slave-trading 
and slave-ownership (Crawford 2002), through to the debt-relief campaigns of the 1990s 
and recent years. Hanlon (2000) shows how the Jubilee 2000 campaign that led to 
lightening of debt burdens applied ideas of basic needs, fair process and human rights to 
the debt crises in the poorest countries. He reviews the history of credit, debt, default, and 
debt relief or forgiveness or repudiation, through the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries. Periodic 
default or relief can be seen as a normal, occasional hazard inherent in the overall richly 
profitable history of lending. However, the same countries in the North that had defaulted 
or repudiated debts at various times in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries were to the fore in 
the late 20
th
 century in enforcing repayment of external debts by low-income countries 
that were in economic crisis, driving them to cut their already low expenditures on basic 
services for water, health and education. The debtor and creditor countries are signatories 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The main victims of the cuts were poorer 
people and children who bore no responsibility for the debts, which had sometimes been 
corruptly arranged. But financial power brings influence, both direct and indirect; thus 
rich country governments have feared to let the biggest irresponsible lenders collapse, 
because of envisaged knock-on effects, and have given priority to supporting them. 
Stiglitz (2005) shows how the IMF and its lead member, the US government, have 
repeatedly prioritised bailing out rich lenders while cutting or diverting resources from 
poor people in poor countries. The Jubilee 2000 campaign’s historically-informed critical 
analyses in terms of basic needs and associated human rights achieved significant impact 
in countering this bias. Various subsequent campaigns for economic, social and health 
rights have also made progress, while still having far to go. 
 
At the levels of development projects and local resource-allocation too, experiences in 
various countries such as Brazil in popular participation in decision-making, including 
around dam construction and in participatory municipal budgeting, show how ethically 
inspired and informed social movements can and do make a difference (see e.g. Goulet 
2005). Fora of globally and locally networked activism, such as the World Social Forum, 
have shown that ‘another globalization is possible’, at least to some useful degree.  
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4. From What and Why to How: some suggestions 
 
4.1. A ‘means of the means’ 
 
Denis Goulet argued that, in order to make a major difference, ethical thinking must 
become ‘the means of the means’: ‘a moral beacon illuminating the value questions 
buried inside instrumental means appealed to by decision-makers and problem-solvers of 
all kinds’ (1988, 157). Since the fate of general intentions depends upon the character of 
the concrete means which are available and assigned to fulfil them—the institutions, 
rules, persons and procedures—so ethical ideals must become well embodied in those 
concrete means, and must pervade and guide their detailed operation. The agenda for 
development ethics includes therefore not just ethical theorising but attention to its 
linkages to attitudes, public action and policy making, to the work of national and global 
institutions and civil society, and to practice-related ethical thinking in these settings. 
Ethics needs to be incorporated into codes, training, policy and planning routines, laws 
and legal process, public debate, and communication strategies.  
 
Professional codes have a role (see, e.g., Inter-American Initiative 2007). Development 
economists work on issues marked by major uncertainty and wield major influence on the 
lives of vulnerable people. Yet, unlike in most other professions, they are not inducted 
into or held accountable by a professional code of practice. They should be obliged to 
make clear the degrees of uncertainty in their understanding and to take into account the 
vulnerability of poor people to unwanted effects resulting from their advice and decisions 
(Stiglitz 2005). George DeMartino has specified major elements of such a code (2005, 
2010). If not partnered though by a readiness of spirit, codes can remain dead letters. 
 
McNeill and St.Clair (2009) warn that much ‘development’ activity has become a sort of 
business: a specialised arena dominated by ‘expert’ professionals and by ‘agencies’ 
dealing with ‘recipients’.4 These experts share an arcane language in which fundamental 
ethical issues and reflection on the costs and risks of their planning are absent or, when 
present, stripped of any direct and painful human content. The role of economists in 
defining and framing development issues is especially important, for they hold central 
roles within development bureaucracies, present their frameworks as value-free, and 
often reject ethical issues as being outside the scope of their science and planning 
(McNeill and St.Clair 2009). In particular, market prices have been widely accorded a 
status like meteorological data that must simply be observed and respected. The task for 
development ethics, in contrast, is to make questions like ‘What is the human rights price 
for water ?’—posed by a student who was perturbed by market-derived prices for water 
that are unaffordable by the poorest groups--seem as normal as the question of what is the 
market price or the direct cost recovery-price. But whereas ‘embedded ethicists’ are now 
not uncommon in medical organizations, the field of economic and social development 
remains riddled with resistance to ethical thinking and queries as to its legitimacy and 
value-added. For development ethics raises issues about fundamental features of intra- 
and inter-national systems of power and is thus not just one more area of applied ethics.  
                                               
4 This paragraph and the next draw partly on material drafted by Asuncion Lera St. Clair. 
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St. Clair (2007) calls too for investigation of the processes of authoritative knowledge 
production. Ethical thinking must be complemented with epistemological reflection, on 
how different cognitive and social values guide attention and research choices, and how 
the choices of these values, implicit or explicit, are influenced by power relations. 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007) argues that ‘cognitive justice’—the democratization 
of expert knowledge and openness to alternative non-Western and non ‘expert’-based 
knowledge—is vital for construction of feasible and attractive alternative futures. 
 
The most fundamental ‘means’ that should be imbued by a development ethic may well 
therefore be professionals, at various levels. Chambers (1997a, 2005) discusses elements 
of an informal professional ethic, an ethos of ethical development:- sensitivity to the 
power of language and to who controls it, and a search for effective generative concepts; 
an openness to listening, which is the most important influence on the use of techniques 
of participatory research and planning, far more important than the technical details; and 
an openness to self-criticism, including about one’s own lifestyle, and to learning how to 
be more while having less. These themes are taken further by, amongst others, Hamelink 
(1997), Giri (2002), and Crocker (2008). 
 
Some authors consider that such perceptions can be dramatically promoted by short 
‘immersion visits’ in which development professionals spend some days or weeks living 
with poor people (Irvine et al. 2004). Such visits must at least be complemented by 
attention to the methods that the professionals have available in their subsequent 
operations, and attention in earlier stages to their prior education. Teaching in schools 
and general citizen education are by far the largest arenas, but academics’ role there is at 
best indirect. Within university teaching, some development ethics textbooks are now 
available, designed for teaching separate optional courses. While such courses can attract 
keen minority audiences, and provide opportunities to train future potential key resource 
persons and to develop ideas, ultimately more important probably is to exert influence 
within mainstream and compulsory courses in public policy, development economics, 
research methodology, and the like. 
  
4.2. Incorporation in methodologies of policy analysis and planning 
 
Crocker (2008) calls for a shift in primary emphasis in development ethics work ‘From 
Moral Foundations to Interpretative and Strategic Concepts’. Many urgently needed 
changes can be justified from several types of moral foundation. More important then 
than further ethical theorizing is conversion of ethical insights into practical and flexible 
working methodologies for value-conscious investigation, design and evaluation, to help 
to guide policy and action. Multi-criteria evaluation methods offer a democratic 
deliberative alternative or partner to cost-benefit analysis, giving more space for 
reflection on value-choices, uncertainties and who will bear the expected and possible 
costs. Hoksbergen (1986) demonstrates methods for drawing out the world views and 
assumptions within given methods of development policy analysis, and then methods for 
proceeding in the opposite direction: beginning with a specified world view and/or ethical 
perspective and working out its possible implications for methods and procedures of 
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policy analysis. Human rights-based approaches provide a key example, having moved 
beyond only lists of human rights norms that are somehow to be legally defended, 
towards using human rights ideas to influence all stages and phases of practice.  
 
Crocker’s own example is Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze’s use of capabilities analysis to 
strategically redirect development policy analysis, illustrated at book length in their 
studies of hunger and public action (1989) and of development challenges and options in 
India (2002), and in some of UNDP’s work on human development. Gasper (2008b) 
attempts to formalize the implied methodology. Jolly and Basu Ray (2007) show how the 
related theme of human security has been applied by a series of national Human 
Development Reports: through a case-specific focussing on the particular threats to the 
particular priority aspects of life that are felt to be at risk in the place and time concerned; 
and wide ranging analysis then of those factors’ causes and effects. The reports 
demonstrate how such a value-led transdisciplinary approach can both retain a 
manageable scope of attention and yield major findings: for example about how certain 
types of economic policy may generate serious morbidity and mortality impacts amongst 
poorer groups.  
 
Evident in both the Sen-Drèze approach and the human security work is case-specific 
deliberation about which priorities will focus and guide investigation, program design 
and evaluation. This is seen too in the basic needs theory created by the Chilean Green 
economist and politician, Manfred Max-Neef, that is influential in some community 
development work worldwide (Max-Neef et al. 1989, 1991). It gives a rich format for 
discussing life-situations and priorities in a community, aiming ‘to promote the 
transformation of an object-person into a subject-person’ (Max-Neef 1992, 198). More 
widely, work on deliberative methodologies and multi-level societal deliberation about 
development choices (see e.g., Cameron and Ojha 2007; Chambers 1997b, 2008; Crocker 
2008; Forester 2009) and on promotion of personal and group agency and autonomy 
(e.g., Ellerman 2004, 2005; Pick & Sirkin 2010) provides suggestions for how to counter 
inequalities in voice between technical specialists, local and international elites, and 
ordinary and poor people. Natural partners for these forms of analysis are social 
movements that represent or support the claims of the weakest groups in national and 
global society.  
 
4.3. Development ethics in the public arena  
 
Development ethics work should function as an interdisciplinary meeting ground where 
diverse disciplines, concerns and approaches interact, rather than primarily as an 
academic subdiscipline in philosophy. Only in this way can it have wider impacts on 
methods, movements and education. Since ethics is a branch within philosophy, 
development ethics work has occurred partly as one niche of practical ethics within 
university worlds. However, just as environmental ethics is certainly not only engaged in 
by disciplinary philosophers, work on development ethics involves people from a wide 
range of backgrounds, including practitioners and scientists of many types. The required 
types of interaction and immersion, in particular contexts each with their own reality, and 
in trying to understand and influence the methods and systems that structure routine 
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practice, must be undertaken by people who remain well connected to those specific 
professional and/or disciplinary areas. 
 
So while Goulet’s vision of the scope of development ethics remains sound, his ideas 
about organisational format require reconsideration (Gasper 2008a). Ethics as the ‘means 
of the means’ is effected situation by situation, in particular professional, physical and 
social niches, rather than by a cadre of super-generalists. At the same time, a widely 
influential development ethics requires also robust general theories—including of needs, 
human rights, capabilities, and deliberative democracy, and of how such frameworks 
connect—in order to motivate and guide action and to communicate across wide spans of 
professional and physical territory.  
 
Human rights work already illustrates the required combination and articulation of 
activities. Besides the traditional locations in political philosophy and academic and 
applied jurisprudence, human rights-based approaches have a broader field of operation: 
seeking to directly influence public policy and action by businesses, individuals, and civil 
society and community groups. For example, in trying to promote basic rights like the 
rights to sufficient food and sufficient clean water, in situations with no single clear-cut 
and capable duty-holder, attention now centres less on continued refinement of an ethical 
case, and rather on building a human rights culture marked by principles of universality, 
accountability, non-discrimination and empowerment, that helps to ensure that the ethical 
case is not marginalised by ‘narrow economistic and political’ concerns (Hansen & Sano 
2006, 54). Human rights campaigning seeks to enter the thinking of voters and 
consumers, gradually affect public consciousness and conscience, and directly and 
indirectly influence the actions of governments, businesses and all manner of 
organizations: for example, to support the provision and subsidy of school lunches for 
children from low-income families as a way to operationalise the right to food. 
 
Agencies which engage in human rights-based campaigning are aware of the skills 
required for public communication, for cooperating with policy agencies and (other) 
social movements, and for grasping attention through effective keywords, indicators, and 
evocative instructive examples. Academics working on development ethics face 
comparable demands, including how to be heard in mainstream journals, popular media 
and social movements, and how to maintain in-depth work while avoiding the trap of 
speaking only to the converted.  
 
4.4. Being ready for crises 
 
As the world rethinks ‘development’ in light of the challenges of sustainability, the past 
and ongoing work on development ethics will be an important resource for the needed 
transformations. In one type of scenario, thoughtful and effectively communicated 
development ethics work could contribute to help steer humanity’s ships away from 
iceberg(s) of pain, misery and possible societal collapse. In another type of scenario, only 
absolute crisis will trigger the institutional and intellectual momentum for major change. 
We cannot tell in advance what mixture of these scenarios  will eventuate. The Great 
Transition Initiative’s work (e.g. Raskin et al. 2002) models various detailed scenarios, 
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that differ according to the combination of (a) intensity of crisis and (b) degree of coping 
capacity. It considers that global coping capacity can only be greatly increased if a 
powerful global citizens movement emerges, combined with sufficient shared vision, a 
shared identity of global citizen, and a realistic change strategy. ‘Turbo-capitalism’ 
(Luttwak 1999), driven by unlimited desire for financial profit, ever increasing 
concentrations of money capital, ever growing spread of the commodity form, and the 
distancing of the powerful from responsibility for and exposure to ‘collateral effects’, 
may not readily self-reform. Only given a powerful and well-oriented global citizens 
movement will even a modest policy reform scenario make much progress, concludes 
Raskin (2006). 
 
Disturbingly, the degree of progress made in instituting a global human rights regime 
since 1945 fits the second type of scenario, of response only after being embroiled in 
crises and disaster, probably better than the first type, of timely and humane anticipation 
and prevention. Conferences and publications on perpetual peace and ‘the rights of man’ 
did not avert the disasters of the First and Second World Wars and other holocausts of the 
late 19
th
 and first half of the 20
th
 century. They did though prepare an intellectual and 
organizational infrastructure that was available to build on when global leaders in the 
1940s sought a new order that could avoid future such disasters (Quataert 2009). This 
illustrates a standard pattern in institutional reform: change may come only after an old 
system enters into severe crisis that hurts also its rulers and supporters. At that stage the 
proponents of change must be ready with viable alternatives that have an ethical rationale 
but have also been convincingly presented and elaborated in terms of consolidated 
language, methods and actionable plans.  
 
Work in development ethics should prepare for both types of scenario. Social change 
happens in many ways. It typically comes either slower than we expect or faster than we 
expect. This can apply both for undesirable as well as desirable change. The required 
preparations include strengthening of exchange with various ethical traditions around the 
globe; engaging better with the realms of activism and practice that seek global justice; 
and essaying further influence in policy and action through strategies and methodological 
tools that consciously incorporate ethical thinking.  
 
 
** 
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